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THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS:
A DOCUMENTED HISTORY (U)

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American 240's as a means of bargaining to obtain GRC agreement to reduce the strength on the Offshore Islands by at least 15,000 men. He reported that he had obtained Chiang's concurrence on the best possible terms. 102

On November 28 General Peng, Commander in Chief of the Army of the Republic of China, in a conversation with General Taylor, stated that Chiang had agreed to a reduction of forces on Quemoy by 15,000 men, provided it were done gradually and firepower were increased. He listed the needed firepower increases and urged increased aid. 103

On December 9, 1958, the formal U.S. - GRC agreement was approved by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

By the end of December the United States had completed an agreement with the GRC which was to lead to reduction of approximately 15,000 men in the manpower on Quemoy.

DULLES AND THE ROLE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

On November 7 Secretary of State Dulles (accompanied by Herter, Murphy, Robertson, Smith and others from State) was, at his request, briefed by a representative of the JCS

at the Pentagon on the effects of nuclear weapons with particular reference to Taiwan.¹⁰⁴ At the conclusion of the briefing, which lasted less than an hour, Dulles asked whether nuclear weapons could be used to take out the artillery pieces opposite Quemoy without extensive civilian damage both in the Amoy area and on Quemoy and Taiwan. The colonel giving the briefing referred the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰⁵

After much discussion of the subject and considerable disagreement both among the Services and between the Services and the Joint Staff, Dulles was informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 8 that:

the batteries could be rendered ineffective by a combination of destruction or damage to the guns and gun emplacements and by inflicting casualties to the personnel operating these guns. By employing air-burst weapons, this could be accomplished with no significant radioactive fall-out implications in either the Amoy area or on Quemoy/Taiwan. Several types of atomic weapons and delivery systems, capable of achieving the above, are available in the area.¹⁰⁶

WARSAW TALKS

The first meeting of the Sino-American talks after the initial Chinese Communist ceasefire was held on October 10.